


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Contending with Revelationism the Transgression of the Totality

Taufan Hendro Baskoro

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Contending with Revelationism the Transgression of the Totality

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Taufan Hendro Baskoro ¹

Abstract

This paper contends with “Revelationism” which is depicted by Malcolm Turvey in his *Doubting Vision*. Its thesis is that any effort made by showing scenes on the screen, no matter how helpful or sophisticated the camera in enhancing the vision ability, will only cause the spectators to cling more on the power of Totalitarian Master and therefore the return to subjectivity is importance. In the first part of the paper, I will start by introducing about the act of seeing followed by examining Turvey's *Doubting Vision* which mainly focuses on Revelationism. In the next part, I will further explore especially part of Turvey's argument related to the contemporary theory, discuss about fantasy of totality, especially body as a totality, and then analyze *Alien* quadrilogy as the example. In the last part, I will establish the laying foundation of my argument connected with the way Totalitarian Master works and para-identification which basically contend with the revelationism. In the conclusion, I argue that movies rather than reveal something, it functions more like giving the notion that the spectators will never understand wholly. Indeed, it is this feeling of being exploited by Totalitarian Master which then clearly shows the importance to return to subjectivity.

Keywords: Ideology, Power, Revelationism, Subjectivity, Totality

Throughout the history, the way people see things are not the same. Political and economic circumstances are believed to play an important role in shaping and changing vision. The compelling argument that vision is always partial is supported by the fact that we always see things from a specific and therefore reductive angle which implies that there is no neutral vantage point.

After the technological development of new optical instruments in the nineteenth century, people had more ways of seeing than before. At that time, vision was deeply affected by the social multiplication of images as the result of industrialization which through geographical and colonial expansion manage to wider distribution of illustrated papers. Such a

powerful feeling gained had to be paid by the price of the possibility that mechanical eyes could now take the place of human eyes and rob them of their traditional privileges. Machines could see for people. The artificial body was beginning to haunt the biological one.

The fact that the bodily eye is decentred becomes the consequence of the growth of mechanical forms of vision. It becomes just one tool out of many. The long and tedious process of painting a body, object or landscape is easily replaced by instant photography. However, some people still believe that there is something uniquely creative about the amount of labour that goes into painting. The complex relationship between eye and optical

¹ Binghamton University, State University of New York, USA & Universitas Brawijaya, Indonesia. E-mail: hello.fictionalspace@gmail.com

technologies (camera and film) will be further discussed by using Malcolm Turvey's *Doubting Vision*.

TURVEY'S DOUBTING VISION

Malcolm Turvey, *Doubting Vision* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) mainly focuses on what Malcolm Turvey calls as "revelationism," a term which Turvey employs as a result of the inadequacy of the categorization made by classical film theorists which generally divided film theory into two parts, namely realism and modernism. Revelationism tends to believe that human vision fails to see the true nature of reality and film in this case can help to solve the inadequacy.

Revelationism has its long root of tradition in skepticism which essentially about human inability in knowing the world around or reality as it is. In *The World Viewed* Stanley Cavell argues that "film is a moving image of skepticism." It is related to what he calls as "automatism," on which removal of "the human agent from the task of reproduction," film, claims, satisfies the wish, borne of skepticism to escape subjectivity and metaphysical isolation. In *Doubting Vision*, Turvey shows that in classical film theory, cinema is art and superior. It is superior compare to that of sculpture, painting, and drawing due to its lack involvement of the artist subjectivity and it is considered as an art because, following Noel Carroll (as cited in Turvey, 2008), it is managed to answer the following :

1. unique properties
2. role or values of these properties
3. Stylistic best suited to exploiting such properties

By following such a template, Turvey manages to differentiate the characteristics among realist, modernist, and revelationist. In responding to the question why cinema is art, the realist will show that it has unique properties especially its capacity to reproduce, rather than manipulate, reality. The technique used to reproduce is mechanical recording.

**realist answer.*

unique = capacity to reproduce, rather than manipulate, reality.

techniques = mechanically record reality (resemble human sight)

André Bazin (as cited in Turvey, 2008), one of the most famous realists, shows that photographs mechanically record reality and by doing so photographs allow humans to "re-present" reality for the first time in history. Bazin celebrates directors such as Wyler and Jean Renoir for their use of stylistic techniques such as the long take that, supposedly, better imitate the "givens of natural perception" than editing.

**modernist answer.*

unique = manipulate reality

techniques = Anti mimetic conception. Rearrange--reconstitute the profilmic event (transpire in front of camera). Least resemble human sight

Rudolf Arnheim (as cited in Turvey, 2008), one of the most important modernists, insists on the fact that he cannot mechanically record and thereby reproduce what is in front of the camera. Rather, he must in some way transform it using unique cinematic techniques such as close-up, slow motion, editing, and time lapse-photography.

**revelationist answer.*

unique = it can reveal the true nature of reality to viewers.

techniques = least resemble human sight

Revelationists believe that cinema can reveal features of reality that are invisible in the sense that it is impossible for the human eye to see them without assistance. Like the realist answer, they views the cinema's ability to mechanically record and reproduce reality as a valuable one, rather than denigrating it, as do modernists such as Arnheim. However, they distrust human vision, and it is this skepticism that sets them apart from realists such as Bazin, because a common feature of realism is a belief in the capacity of the naked human eye to see reality.

However, Turvey argues that although theorists in the revelationist tradition have made a convincing point on the cinema's revelatory power, their cling on visual technology and its ability to explore techniques beyond human vision is incorrect foundation since the nature of film is not similar to science. Turvey describes that those techniques used by traditionalists in their film analyses do not reveal something that we are incapable of seeing unaided. According to Turvey, the theorists and film-makers best representing the revelation tradition are Epstein, Vertov, Balázs, and Kracauer who are bounded by their belief that cinema's most significant feature is its capacity to reveal truths about reality invisible to the naked eye.

On the next part, Turvey shows that contemporary film theory is built by using theories of Marx and Freud which has been modified through the writings of Louis Althusser and Jacques Lacan. According to Althusser (as cited in Turvey, 2008), people believe that they are autonomous agents with free will (subjects) even though actually they are controlled by (subject to) the capitalist social formation through 'ideological state apparatuses.' People can easily be mistaken because they misrecognize themselves. This can be explained through Lacan theory which shows that humans are born into a condition of "no-thingness," of psychic fragmentation and dispersal in which there is no distinction between self and other. As a child develops, he forms an image of himself (the ego) as an autonomous, unified entity separate from the world around him. However, this image is an illusion because the real condition of the subject, Lacan believed, remains no-thingness ("the Real").

Semiotic-psychoanalytical film theorists, following Althusser and Lacan, conceived of humans as laboring under an epistemic illusion, the false belief that they are subjects. Lacan's mirror stage, on which the infant identifies with its mirror image, mistaking the image of himself as autonomous and unified for truth, is appropriated by Christian Metz (as cited in Turvey, 2008) claiming that the viewer

identifies with the perceptual experience created for him by the cinema, mistaking the experience of autonomy and unity it affords him ("all-perceiving") for his own ("it is I who make the film"). He takes what the camera has recorded as his own percepts, thereby experiencing the epistemic and visual illusion that he is seeing reality rather than a filmic representation.

According to Noël Carroll (as cited in Turvey, 2008) this claim is false since films are not standardly designed to deceive their viewers that they are in the presence of reality rather than a representation. With regard to the issue, Richard Allen has attempted to rehabilitate the concept of illusion for film theory by distinguishing between illusions that give rise to false beliefs and illusions that deceive the senses but do not result in false beliefs. However, according to Turvey, it is a misuse of the concept of illusion. He insists that an illusion is not something that we can choose to experience. Rather, an illusion is something that happens to the senses, which is why we speak of illusions as deceiving us. Turvey argues that while watching film there is no illusion involved at all, and we see that it is a representation the entire time.

Despite of Turvey's argument, semiotic-psychoanalytical film theorists has contributed to revelation theory by claiming that the cinema as revealing truths about reality by making visible its own internal properties and conventions, a process that came to be known as "reflexivity." It does so by breaking the illusion that the viewer is in the presence of reality when watching a film. Therefore, it reveals the truth masked by this illusion which is the film itself. By drawing the viewer's attention to the properties, conventions, and processes of the cinema, reflexivity forces the viewer to see what he is really in the presence of a film, not reality. Further, reflexivity shatters the illusion theorized by Althusser and Lacan on which the viewer's mistaken belief that he is a subject, an autonomous, free, unified agent. The truth masked by this illusion is thereby revealed to the viewer: his no-thingness.

**Revelationist Tradition:*

distrust human vision: yes
cinema's features : exploited to escape the flaws
of human vision.

**Semiotic-psychoanalytical film theorists:*

distrust human vision: yes
cinema's properties: reinforce these flaws, vision's
propensity to experience epistemic and visual il-
lusions.

**semiotic-psychoanalytical film theorists:*

- a. Sight was to be distrusted, at least in part,*
because it helps reproduce the epistemic illu-
sion that humans are subjects by mistaking
false images of the self as unified and auton-
omous for reality
- b. Humans mistake representations for truth,*
and, like Althusser, that this mistake serves
the economic interests of the ruling class
- c. The eye could not be trusted because it mis-*
takes representations, cinematic representa-
tions, and representations of the self for reali-
ty

Then Turvey explains that in art history, visual skepticism is found in artistic modernism, especially abstract painting and sculpture, whose most distinctive feature is 'against an idealization of vision.' It suspects vision and its hegemonic role in the modern era and therefore it creates "antivisual" or "antiocular-centric" discourse. Modernists mostly agree that standard, everyday, normal, physical vision is flawed in some crucial respect and therefore cannot be trusted. They argue that art should "battle against the automatization of perception," and it should break with the way the reality standardly appears to everyday sight through the "device of impeded perception." Through the device of impeded perception, genuine art is expected to get closer than normal vision to true reality. Art here is expected to help to see more and better than normal vision since normal vision, due to familiarity, tends to overlook things.

In the concluding paragraph, Turvey claims that "If philosophers such as Wittgenstein and Ryle are right, sight is not fundamentally unreliable, as modernists and revelationist film theorists and film-makers tend to argue. Skep-

ticism about human vision is therefore not a solid foundation on which to build theories of film and should be abandoned." However it does not mean that cinema does not reveal anything. He argues that the revelation done by cinema is not in terms visual inadequacy but rather it reveals truths about human beings and their environments that are invisible in the sense of being concealed or overlooked.

**Modernist*

skeptic on human vision = yes
unique = it can reveal things overlooked

**Turvey*

skeptic on human vision = no
unique = it can reveal things overlooked

In short, based on the characteristics Turvey builds, Epstein, Vertov, Balaz, Kracauer who tend to reveal with the goal still to reality can be considered as realist-revelationists, while Turvey himself, in terms of his revelationism that does not necessarily involve recording reality can be considered as modernist-revelationist who are **not** skeptic about human vision.

**realist-revelationists*

reveal = the reality
skeptic about human vision = Yes

**modernist-revelationist*

reveal = the overlooked
skeptic about human vision = Yes

**modernist-revelationist (Turvey)*

reveal = the overlooked
skeptic about human vision = No

**semiotic-psychoanalytical film theorists*

reveal = the nothingness
skeptic about human vision = Yes

However, Turvey does not give a fair judgment for example on the issue of illusion. Turvey takes illusion too literal. I can argue that the mirror stage in which the infant feels united does not happen to adult (not wholly). Adult does not say when he is in front of the mirror that it is not him but at the same time he also realizes that it is not him. Lacan's identification and ego is the result of mirror stage.

The separation happen because the infant demands and the mother cannot fulfill it. In terms of Metz of course I will also still argue that we also have a separated feeling. It is important to note that it is not only the one unfulfilled (little a) but there is also the need is still fulfilled (desire = demand - need). That is why, though we are separated from the movie, we can still be happy, sad, scared, etc since we get carried away by these fulfilled need in the process of identification. If he insists on the definition that illusion means that we do not realize at all, then how can a viewers cry? the viewer should simply always say that all of those scenes are fake.

Another problem is eventhough his argument is quite compelling, he does not explain in practice how his new type of revelation to be conducted. Without telling us what to do after cinema exposes something overlooked, then Turvey's theories seems so shallow. He does not give us any examples on how his theory is going to be applied. All we can do is jump to other theories so that we can attach meaning to those once overlooked. Therefore, in the next discussion the paper will elaborate more on contemporary theory especially those engaging with struggle to get rid of the illusion or fantasy of totality. The laying foundation here is a matter of gaining a sense of self by identifying with something other than ourselves which Lacan calls as a misrecognition. We take the representation such as films as the real, or like the example we are going to discuss, we take the image to be our real body.

FANTASY OF TOTALITY

In order to create a meaning, we need a context and context requires a frame and frame involves including and excluding. In Lacan's discourses and terms, it can be illustrated by saying that in the truth position (\$) we want to say 'fan'. In S1 (master signifier) we then use the word 'fan'. Of course the word 'fan' is ambiguous and it needs context or further definition to be understood. Therefore, we go to the chain of S2 or symbolic order to get better meaning. However, S2 will keep sliding since there is no end in context or definition. In order to stop S2 from sliding,

we need to **fantasize the totality**. The belief in such a fantasy is called **ideology**.

If to see itself means to frame, then it means that to see is framing and fantasizing totality. The same is true for to film or to capture using camera. Despite the argument showing that film enable us to see the reality objectively, film cannot avoid the fact that it is also framing and at the same time fantasizing totality. As we discuss, the relation of fantasy of totality and films, *Alien* qudrilogy, especially which are connected with the issue of the body, will be used to illustrate the fantasy of totality.

Ideology and Power

The way eyes and camera work is quite similar. While a camera involves camera shutter to limit the light absorbed, eyes exclude or allow light to enter the body through the eyelids. However, the pupil which function to regulate the amount of light by shrinking or expanding hardly handles the light intensity which can change over ten thousand times since the pupil area can only change up to twenty-five times. This is a blatant proof showing that the eye is not all-powerful and it prescribes that we shouldn't always trust what we see.

The most significant difference between the biological eye and the photographic camera is the fact that the camera snaps an image and fixes it permanently while the eye doesn't. It records images as scenes in constant movement and it uses different nerves and combines their messages in different ways to adapt to its surroundings which make it more like a TV camera than a photographic camera. Such realization that the eye deals not with frozen frames but with moving images challenges further the authority of seeing. We never see one thing in one way. We are actually incessantly processing billions of visual impulses through various channels and codes. These codes are largely determined by a culture's ideological agendas. The claim that if a camera sees you, it sees you objectively is now questioned. The resemblance between the bio-

logical eye and the photographic camera may suggest that the eye, too, could frame or fix reality. But the realization that the eye resembles a TV camera more than a photographic one emphasizes that reality is not a sequence of frozen snapshots but rather a matter of ceaseless movement and flow. The consequence of this is clear. There is no medium that mirrors the world objectively. Any image and any instrument used to produce images derive their power from their ideological usefulness. In short, when we see things, we are framing the things according to specific rules and regulations. All visual forms of expression involve particular guidelines, procedures and laws. In abiding to such principles, we situated ourselves in culturally approved ways.

Many of Michel Foucault's writings are engaging with such an ideology imposed by the power relying on particular visual strategies. Power in this case uses the eye as an instrument of surveillance. It can dominate its subjects by means of an all-encompassing gaze, which sees everything and yet remains unseen. The power that defines us by constantly gazing at us may be in the form of moral and religious rules, legal systems and mass-produced image. Once we fail to conform to those ideas, we become unacceptable (defiant, irregular, undesirable). It could be that nobody is literally watching us. But powerful ideas are there all the time to remind us what we should look like and how we should look at other people and objects. There comes a point when we become critical surveyors of ourselves. There's no need for 'Big Brother' any more. Once we have internalized the power of the gaze, we are the first to know if we've stepped off the mark.

Body as a totality

The act of seeing will frame and create meaning which then as a result will build identities as pursued by all cultures. The way we perceive our own and other people's bodies magnify the process and it may explain why different societies have regularly tried, through a variety of laws and rituals, to delimit the body and to erect clear boundaries around it.

However, the body's boundaries are difficult to trace. They are uncertain because to establish where the body 'begins' and where it 'ends' is also quite problematic.

According to Michel Foucault (1984), the body is central to the social sciences (psychology, medicine, sociology, criminology) and to the institutions through which such sciences operate (hospitals, schools, prisons, law courts). Both the human sciences and institutions work according to one main rule: defining the difference between 'normal' and 'abnormal' bodies. Once this distinction is established, people's behaviour can be regulated and disciplined.

However, perceptions of madness, sickness, disability and criminality are not fixed but alter radically over time. The only one thing that is quite constant is the fact that we tend to rely on the abnormal to define the normal and in terms of body it means that we decide the abnormality first to determine what normality should be. By doing so, signs of the abnormal body are significant since without an idea of the abnormal we could have no idea of the normal. In making such a distinction, Foucault designs **dividing practices** that enables him to segregate the sick, the insane and the unlawful, or in short the abnormal.

In such a design, power has become invisible: it sees everything while remaining unseen. Power which relies on an all-seeing gaze further evolves based on the idea of the Panopticon: an ideal prison in which each body is confined to a small cell and can be observed all the time by a single person sitting in a central tower. The inmates can be seen constantly but cannot see either their observer or one another. This same structure can apply to schools, hospitals, factories and barracks. In this design, the subject body's drives are thoroughly manipulated for the purpose of producing efficient and 'docile' subjects. The sense that we are being looked at all the time supports this process. We are made to think that we have to control our bodies so that they will appear normal and respectable to our invisible observer. We are made to feel

ashamed and guilty if we fail to conform to what is acceptable.

The condition of being trapped in the illusion of panopticon presuppose individual involvement to make it happens. It is best depicted in Lacan's argument (as cited in Turvey, 2008) which claim that infants in mirror stage will misunderstand their reflection or live in a state of undifferentiation since they do not experience their bodies as separate from the rest of the world. In such a stage, which also commonly known as Imaginary, infants experience misrecognition on which they gain a sense of self by identifying with something other than themselves and take the image to be their real body.

Lacan (as cited in Turvey, 2008) argues that once we acquire language, our understanding of our bodies and physical surroundings will be shaped by language. What he means by 'language' is not simply words but rather all the symbols and structures that constitute a particular culture: social codes, conventions, laws, institutions, structures of kinship and gender roles. We can only function in the adult world if we have a grip on basic symbols shared by enough people to make communication possible. The Symbolic Order is the world we enter when we acquire language. In the Symbolic, we realize that our bodies are distinct from other people and objects.

The process of acquiring language also develop an unconscious. Lacan states (as cited in Turvey, 2008) that 'the unconscious is structured as a language'. This means that like language, the unconscious is made up of symbols and signs. But it also means that language produces the unconscious. When we acquire language, we have to adapt our desires and fantasies to the symbols which form the language of our culture. These symbols are always limited: they can never fully express all our fantasies and desires. What language cannot communicate must be repressed, pushed back beyond the level of consciousness. The repressed materials go to constitute the unconscious.

From this point onwards, human life is governed by an insatiable desire: the longing to make language mean what we wish to say, in the painful awareness that words can never fully embody the contents of our minds. Often, we become the victims of another form of misrecognition: we assume we are in control of words and meanings, when in fact we are molded by them. We do not speak language, we are spoken by it.

Before the acquisition of language, we don't know what to make of our bodies because we have no points of cultural reference outside ourselves. We cannot define our bodies. With language come ways of defining our bodies as separate, we are given means to distinguish our bodies from the rest of the world. But the moment the body is framed by words, it, too, becomes a word, an arbitrary cultural symbol. In the Imaginary, the body is physical but cannot be defined. In the Symbolic, the body can be defined but is stripped of its materiality.

In short, the body is shaped by how we see it and represent it. We are culturally trained to perceive the body in organized ways, from certain angles and through certain lenses. Vision is always socially groomed. A culture's power structures depend largely on how we look and are looked at.

Alien Quadrilogy

The *Alien* film franchise (also known as Aliens) namely *Alien* (1979), *Aliens* (1986), *Alien 3* (1992), and *Alien Resurrection* (1997), focuses on Ellen Ripley and her encounter with an extraterrestrial lifeform, commonly referred to as "the Alien". Despite the fact that the mission in exploring the outer space may expand the border of knowledge, from the title of the films it is easily inferred that something wrong is about to happen. However, the films are not merely about the horror of Ripley's battle against the alien but also how she in the end evolves into a creature which might turn herself into alien.

The idea of combining the human and the non-human, commonly known as part-bodies

or hybrids, can be found in the ancient myth from all over the world. The feeling that the body is incomplete drive us to create or imagine a creature partially human and partially animal, or partially biological and partially mechanical. The images of the werewolf, vampire, Frankenstein's monster, are the blatant proof of such ideas.

In making a hybrid creature, the most important part is that at first we have to make a clear boundaries on what we call as a body so that if it is already clear we can simply attach something else and consider it as hybrid. However, a question comes up. Should the things attached to the body bring advantage first before it is called a hybrid? *Alien* franchise is also engaging in such a problem. When a small alien creature bursts from Kane chest, can it be considered as a hybrid? is the alien deserved to be killed? We might argue that the alien here is deserved to be killed. The justification is not the fact that the alien invade the body but merely the fact that the alien discussed is not useful to the body. It is hard to imagine human bodies without any alien inside, either bacteria or worm, which implies that normal and abnormal body is only a matter of majority or minority body. However, as long as it is considered to be useful then it will not be considered as a threat and even not as aliens simply because it is useful.

However, Ripley case (as cited in Turvey, 2008) is different. In contrast to what we expected, compare to the marine, Ripley tend to follow the rule and regulation. It seems to suggest that while they are outside in the space, the marine tend to be loosely attached to the regulation due to the lack of the gaze of the Big brother. It practically suggests that the internalization of the gaze affect Ripley more, despite of the fact that the reason might be because she already know the risk and does not want to confront the alien hastily. Yet, it is questionable whether such a docility is still intact with Ripley when she has been reproduced into the Ripley clone. As depicted in the movie, the treatment received by Ripley is no longer merely as a human. The Ripley clone may be considered as a hybrid, but

when her docility is in question she tends to be treated as a whole entity, namely alien. In short, while having acid blood might be useful for her and making her as a perfect hybrid, Ripley is considered as a threat by the company and thus treated as an alien.

This argument is further accentuated by the fact that android is not different than alien. Ash, Bishop, and Call are androids. In terms of what they are made of, essentially they are aliens. They are less similar to human. The only thing that make them to be called android and not alien is simply because of their docility, in this case towards the company. If only they turn into a threat, then it is almost certain that they will be considered as aliens. Therefore, the totality of the body is quite difficult to be defined, whether based on definition, rules, or docility.

CONTENDING WITH REVELATIONISM

Revelationism by definition will bring us more knowledge which hopefully make us better. It has already been explained above that revelationists advocate it as a mass enlightenment, even religiously speaking. However, I contend to such a notion. I argue that as an individual, the more things are revealed, the more we feel lost. Therefore all we need to do is subjectively create a totality based on our advantage and not otherwise. In presenting my argument I will freely use Slavoj Zizek's theory.

Classical Master and Totalitarian Master

Once you eliminate the impossible,
whatever remains,
no matter how improbable, must be the
truth.

(Arthur Conan Doyle)

The notion of power which is important for the master basically relies heavily on belief. Zizek's Classical Master and Totalitarian Master I argue even though both relies on belief but actually operates differently. Classical Master gains its power based on the slave and

the master's belief itself. For example, King in the ancient time will make stories or myths to associate himself as descendent of gods. By doing so people will believe in him and he gets the power. But what happens if people disbelieve in him? Zizek illustrates such case with Santa Clause. The presupposition here is that the father disbelieves in Santa Clause and he just pretends to believe in it for the sake of the son. The same goes for the son. He disbelieves in Santa Clause but he pretend to believe in it for his father. Therefore, in case of Classical Master, King and his people, even the people disbelieve in king still they rely on the king. However I argue that it can happen only in the fact that by believing in the king the people also get the advantage, just like the son believes in Santa Clause and get his gifts. I claim that the way totalitarian master gain its power is totally different. While classical Master get his power by using such a belief based on association to myth or advantage gained, totalitarian master has the advantage of getting power out of belief which relies on nothingness.

To illustrate my argument easily is by using Monty Hall's problem on which people are asked to choose one door out of three doors. Behind one of the door lies a present while the other two doors are empty. After one door is picked, one of the door is eliminated from the option and leaving only two doors left. The question is whether people will still stay with their choice or swap the choice to the other door. The answer is of course changing to the other door since the probability is getting bigger by doing so. To make the explanation clear, it is easier if we change the 3 doors with a deck of card. If people are asked to choose queen of heart, the possibility the choice is right is $1/52$. Now that the 50 other cards are eliminated and leaving only 2 cards and once again the choice has to be made then of course swapping the choice will increase the probability to $51/52$ which is almost always right. The way it works is the same with the way totalitarian master works. Totalitarian master, for example democracy (I know it sounds strange that I consider even democra-

cy as totalitarian, but the method it works on is the same as any other totalitarian), will never reveal what democracy is. People are free to choose. Then totalitarian master will explain something which is not democracy. Since the possible explanation is infinite and always reveal which is not then it imposes the belief that people are free to choose but their choice will always wrong and the last card left is the best one. The way it operates of course by not revealing the last card since if it is done then it returns as classical master. Therefore totalitarian master is using the emptiness, the void, the last card, to manipulate people to believe in its power even though they disbelieve in it and worse even they know it won't give any advantage. Whenever people try to attack the concept, It will like fighting with emptiness. How can people attack democracy if the definition of democracy keeps sliding and the real answer is never achieved, just like the last card that is never revealed? It is important to keep in mind that everything operates in the psychoanalyses realm which in Johari's window is in Unknown Knowns. It means that people do not know that actually they know what is going on. Indeed, it is almost resounding *The X Files* tag line "the truth is out there" since people will be confused but seem to impose belief on themselves that there must be some truth may be not with them but out there.

In other perspective, even it is quite daring, I claim that Classical Master tends to acts as Imaginary Virtual which of course once people shows its Imaginary Real, 'The Thing', the monstrous side of it then it will collapse. (example of Imaginary Virtual is the image of someone we are talking to, while its Imaginary Real is the fact that that person made into image is actually also defecating, sweating, etc which of course not supposed to come up in Imaginary Virtual. For linguist the better explanation is the fact that 'word' in itself is already metaphor (at the level of imaginary) since 'word' is always referring to something which is not itself, while the metaphor people are familiar with is the second metaphor working in Symbolic Order. The belief in 'word' can collapse if we insist focusing on its

Imaginary Real which is 'letter' or 'stroke made to make the letter'). On the other hand, Totalitarian Master is strong in his position because he is in Symbolic Virtual. The example of totalitarian master works very well clearly happens in the works of art especially painting. Though most people do not understand the beauty of cubism, they will pretend to know it and it is simply because they believe that there is someone out there who knows why it is beautiful and not to mention the price itself is very high which imposing the idea that the painting is good.

The problem of sequel. Art as a totality.

Arturo Fallico (as cited in Zizek, 2008) once said that the difference between the world and art, which inheres in the fact that in its spontaneity, the world presents itself to us as "not-done-and-having-to-be-attended-to." The artwork, in contrast, presents itself as a totality, a completed unity, a fullness, and a completeness that is unavailable anywhere else in existence. The "still life" is the exemplar of all art. "In art," says Fallico, "everything is, nothing is becoming or has need to become." Only art conquers time. In art time does stay.

The main purpose of art which at first as a totality now is disrupted. Sequel brings the feeling of incompleteness. A feeling that there is something more is coming. That no matter how many things are presented, it will never enough to be considered as a whole. I can, for example, use *Alien* which has sequel, or another shows which has series, remake, franchise etc to illustrate the feeling of no totality which haunt us. At this point, I treat *Alien* franchise similar to what Mikhail Bakhtin calls as genre, a narrative mode which he treated as if they were living entities. The disparity of eighteen years between *Alien* and *Alien: Resurrection*, strongly suggests that the series acquired a life of its own, shaped by changing industrial pressures and audience patterns. However, I argue that *Alien* does not reveal something but it only deprives the spectators since they will always feel that there is always someone out there who knows more. In short, rather than revealing something or even func-

tion as mass enlightenment, it will strengthen the power of totalitarian master since the illusion it creates getting stronger and stronger.

My argument may sound similar to Marxism or ideological hegemony in a sense that I am complaining about what is shown on the screen. However, that is not my point. No matter what kind of scene being shown on the screen will not be able to avoid the impact on the spectators side, which is the feeling that the truth is out there. In this sense of course we can say that they have already turned into docile bodies.

The problem of the word "reveal"

The word 'reveal' tends to be associated with something more and better. For example when we see a picture, we will get the general notion about the picture. If we zoom the picture, we will get better notion about what happens in the pictures. Many Marxist critics will argue about why choosing that picture since the beginning. In such a case, Turvey argument will be similar to those of Modernist. He will tend to highlight depiction of the picture which mostly overlooked. The only difference is he does this without doubting vision. All these notion consider revelationism in a positive stance. On the contrary, I argue that no matter what pictures are shown will only create the feeling of there-is-something-more-out-there. I consider the assumption that there is something more out there that might someday be revealed will only bring negative effect due to our dependence to other in giving us revelation or meaning.

In other words, if revelationists believe that cinema had the potential to be an instrument of mass enlightenment, and this is why they held its revelatory power in such high regard, and if Turvey insists on the revelatory power of cinema lies not because its ability to enhance human vision but rather because of its power to teach us to see to which direction to see, and also if marxist theorist will question why those are the ones screened, then my argument is on the contrary since I emphasize on the fact in this age of mass production, the

more movies are shown, the more feeling of not fully understood grasped by the spectators.

Para-identification. The return to Subjectivity.

While watching a movie, normally spectators will identify themselves with the main characters. For those who challenge the main characters probably will take the binary opposition position, let us say the position of the oppressed. However my idea is slightly different. What I mean by para-identification is the attempt to identify ourselves with something beyond (para) the scene depicted. In the case of *Alien* for example, rather than simply identify ourselves to Ripley or to the alien I suggest that we can identify to the Indian, Maori, or Aborigines. It can be done simply by changing the alien into the oppressed and then turn it into something else. In short, para-identification is simply identification to something beyond to those depicted on the screen.

In doing so, the characters and settings can completely be changed. The characters or settings can be substituted based on similarities or contrasts. The black aliens can be dressed in pink costumes. Such a question like 'what would machiavelli do?' can be used as a starting point to define our actions toward the situation given.

In this case, objectivity is blurred and subjectivity is taking over. The journey to the self to frame or to create the totality of the art perceived which thus gaining meaning become the major goal in watching movies. Subjectivity is the only thing that cannot be imposed to us. No matter how hard the doctrines, we can always frame it differently. In short, I take a position that once we believe in the post structuralism or contemporary theories, we are no longer in the illusion of totality and I argue that we have the power to create a totality for ourselves. It is what Kierkegaard and Buddha also have already done.

According to Kierkegaard (as cited in Zizek, 2008), rather than searching for the Truth with a capital T, it is more important to

find the kind of truths that are meaningful to the individual's life. It is important to find 'the truth for me.' He thus sets the individual, or each and every man, up against the 'system.' Buddha answered by likening the monk to a man who gets pierced by a poisoned arrow. The wounded man would have no theoretical interest in what the arrow was made of, what kind of poison it was dipped in, or which direction it came from. In such circumstances he would most likely want somebody to pull it out and treat the wound.

Things we can know through reason, or knowledge, are according to Kierkegaard totally unimportant. Eight plus four is twelve. We can be absolutely certain of this. That's an example of the sort of 'reasoned truth' that every philosopher since Descartes had talked about. But do we include it in our daily prayers? Is it something we will lie pondering over when we are dying? Not at all. Truths like those can be both 'objective' and 'general,' but they are nevertheless totally immaterial to each man's existence." You don't think about the law of cause and effect or about modes of perception when you are in the middle of your first kiss."

CONCLUSION

Revelationism which once considered to be helpful in bringing mass enlightenment simply fail due to the fact that clinging on something outside of self will keep on sliding. As I have already explained above, the movies rather than reveal something, they function more like giving the notion that the spectators will never understand wholly. Such a lack of totality is the feeling exploited by Totalitarian Master. Therefore, based on that, I suggest the importance to return to subjectivity in attempt to create subjective totality.

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